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Abstract- Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are susceptible 
to most security attacks. There are some limitations such as 
reliability, energy efficiency, and scalability, which affect sensor 
nodes. These limitations mostly affect the security of wireless 
networks. Also, limited capacity of sensor nodes accounts for the 
security attacks on WSNs. Applications such as military 
surveillance, traffic surveillance, healthcare, and environmental 
monitoring are impacted by security attacks. Hence, researchers 
have created various types of detection approaches against such 
attacks. Selective forwarding attack is an example of an attack 
that is not easily detected particularly in the networks layer. In 
this type of attack, malicious nodes function in the same way as 
other nodes in the networks. However, it tries to drops the 
sensitive information prior to transferring the packet to other 
sensor node. In this paper, we proposed a new approach for 
detecting and monitoring selective forwarding attacks in wireless 
sensor networks. The new approach guaranteed to keep the data 
transferring between nodes safely. 
Keywords- Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) and Selective 
Forwarding Attacks. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The challenges in the network layer are limited memory, 
buffering, and saving power. Hence, these challenges are 
impacted to the WSNs. Routing is the major function in this 
layer. Network layer is subjected many routing protocols for 
instance, Flat routing, and hierarchal routing. The simple 
function of the routing protocol is to fmd the reliability path. 
Data aggregation is used in flat routing. It a set of automated 
methods combining the data that comes from sensor nodes into 
a set of relevant infonnation and exclude the duplication [1]. 
LEACH is a popular hierarchy routing protocol [2]. It separates 
the network into clusters and randomly and selects the cluster 
head to do the routing function from cluster to the base station. 
A network layer in WSNs is subjected to many types of 
attacks. Furthermore, a sensor node may acquire advantages of 
multi-hop by simply refusing to route packets. Therefore, it 
could be executed all the time with the net result. If a 
neighboring node marks a route through the malicious node, 
then it will be unable to modify messages [3]. There are 
assortments of attacks targeting the network layer. The attacker 
can attack the routing protocol by injecting the path between 
the source and the base station. 
Sensors, ad hoc, mobile, and wireless are properties merged 
together in networks. They are a wide assortment of 
implementations in the real world. These implementations are 
for instance, monitoring factory environments, and energy 
emergency response information [4]. The sensor networks 
susceptible different types of security threats from attackers at 
most layers of the networks. Network layer is the important 
layer in the networks and prone many types of security attacks. 
The most attacks in sensor network routing are spoofmg, 
selective forwarding, sinkhole, Sybil attack, wormhole attack, 
node replication attack, flooding and attack against privacy. 
Selective forwarding attack is the type of attack that we focus 
on it. It is an insider attacks and the adversaries are able to 
create routing loops that attract or repeal network traffic. Also, 
they can extend or shorten source routers, generate false 
messages, and attempt to drop the significant messages. The 
drop packets come from one node or a set of nodes. A 
malicious node refuses to forward the messages or drop 
packets randomly [4]. The positions of the nodes do not need to 
be predetermined. Sensor nodes are deployed in high-risk 
areas. The majority of WSN protocols do not have the security 
to prevent simple attacks on the nodes [5]. Thus, sensor 
network protocol and algorithms should be self-organizing. 
Some design factors exist for sensor networks and sensor 
nodes. These factors are significant in the design of protocols 
or algorithms. The impact of these factors can be used to 
compare different approaches [6]. The factors include 
scalability, fault tolerance, network topology, power 
consumption, production cost, hardware constraints, 
environment, and transmission media. 
The features of sensor nodes guarantee many applications. 
The rapid deployment, self-organization, and fault tolerance 
can provide a promising sensing method for certain functions, 
such as control, communication, and computing [7], [8]. 
Networks have different applications. Therefore, applications 
comprise several levels of monitoring, tracking, and 
controlling. A group of applications is employed for specific 
purposes. In military applications, sensor nodes include 
monitoring, battlefield surveillance and object tracking. The 
battlefield monitors utilized in military operations have 
prompted the development of WSNs. In medical applications, 
sensors aid in patient diagnosis and monitoring. The majority 
of these applications are deployed to monitor an area and react 
when a sensitive factor is recorded [9]. 
II. SELECTIVE FORWARDING ATTACKS 
Sensor nodes use communication to transfer packets from 
the source to base station by using multi-hop. In selective 
forwarding attack, malicious nodes have attempted to stop the 
packets in a network by rejecting message forwarding. It i� not 
easy to detect this type of attack due to unreliable 
communications. Selective forwarding attacks can be impacted 
to some routing protocols [1]. It compromised node has notable 
consequences. A compromised node selectively drops packets. 
Malicious nodes work in the same manner such as other nodes 
in the network field. However, these malicious nodes attempt 
to find sensitive messages and drop them before sending the 
entire packets to the next nodes. The attacker makes sensor 
network rely on the redundancy forwarding by using broadcast 
for data to spread in network. Based on researchers, limited 
power and low memory are obstacles that make conventional 
security measures inappropriate for WSNs [2]. The attacker 
compromises internal sensor nodes then launch attacks, which 
it is hard to detect it. Sensor node has limited communication 
and computational resources. It has short radio range and it is 
simply compromised by an attacker. The attacker can refuse to 
forward the messages to other nodes or drop sensitive 
information. For this reason, the base station may not receive 
the entire message. 
Fig I. Selective Forwarding Attack-Drop Some Packets 
Sensor node has limited communication and computational 
resources. It has short radio range and it is simply 
compromised by an attackers. As a result, in figure 1 node A 
sent some packages (PI, P2, P3, and P4) to node B using the 
route that is between the two nodes. The attacker breaks the 
link between nodes and steals two packets (PI and P3), keep 
the other packets (P2 and P4) transferred to the base station. 
In figure 2, there are two sensor nodes A and B transfer 
some packets to node C. node A send (P2 and P4) and node B 
send (PI and P3). The attacker who breaks the link between 
nodes drop the two packets that sent from node A so the entire 
packet is not transferred to the base station. However, the other 
two packets that sent from node B were transferred to node C. 
Fig 2. Selective Forwarding Attack-Drop Entire Packets 
III. RELATED WORKS 
Yu and Xiao [10] proposed an approach based on 
lightweight security to detect a selective forwarding attack in 
the environment of sensor networks. The approach utilized a 
multi-hop acknowledgment to launch alarms by obtaining 
responses from the nodes that are located in the middle of 
paths. Authors assumed the approach could identify malicious 
sensor nodes. The aim of the detection attack is to send an 
alarm when a malicious node is discovered, which indicates a 
selective forwarding attack. Yu and Xiao employed two 
detection processes in the scheme which are downstream 
process and upstream. A report packet is created and sent to the 
base station hop by hop when nodes detect a malicious node. 
Therefore, the base station would receive the alarm packet and 
forward mUltiple hops that are produced by the node. An 
acknowledgement packet and an alert packet will drain the 
energy during detection. 
Tran Hoang and Eui-Nam [11] proposed an approach 
against selective forwarding attacks that consists of a 
lightweight detection mechanism. The detection is a centralized 
cluster, which utilized the two-hop neighborhood node 
information and overhearing technique. It is dependent on the 
broadcast nature of sensor communication and the high density 
of sensors. Each sensor node is provided with a detection 
module that is constructed on an application layer. Sensor node 
sets routing rules and two-hop neighbor knowledge to generate 
an alert packet. Hoang and Nam suggested that the two routing 
rules make the monitoring system more suitable. Thus, the first 
rule is to determine if the destination node forwards the packet 
along the path to the sink. When the malicious counter crossed 
the threshold X, it revoked the malicious node from its 
neighbor list. 
Huijuan Deng et aI, [12] proposed an approach to secure 
the data transmission and detecting a selective forwarding 
attack. They used watermark technology to detect malicious 
nodes. Prior to employing a watermark technique, they used a 
trust value to determine a source path for message forwarding. 
The trust value involves weighting the credit of each sensor 
node. They assumed that the base station is always trustworthy 
and cannot be comprised by the adversary, which renders the 
scheme inappropriate for real wireless sensor networks. Every 
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node has a trust value. At the beginning of network initializing, 
all nodes should have the same trust value. Huijuan Deng et al. 
utilized the watermark technique to calculate the packet loss. 
Data transmission begins when an optimal routing path is 
confIrmed. The base station creates a K bits binary sequence as 
the original watermark message. Therefore, a watermark 
message is part of the packets. A base station compares the 
extract watermark to the original watermark to detect a 
selective forwarding attack. 
Chanatip et al. [13] have proposed a lightweight approach. 
They used Extra Monitor (EM) to eavesdrop and monitor all 
traffIc when transferring data between nodes. They also 
employed RSSI to detect a sinkhole attack. The value of RSSI 
is that four EM nodes can be arranged to establish the positions 
of all sensor nodes, of which the base station position should be 
(0, 0). Chanatip et al. have assumed that the network is static 
when sensor nodes are deployed; thus, any change in the type 
of topology will immediately affect their approach. They 
assumed that the attackers could capture and damage the nodes. 
Therefore, all sensor nodes must protect or use tamper robust 
hardware. 
IV. PROPOSED SYSTEM 
In wireless sensor network, several nodes transfer sensor 
readings to the base station to process data. Military bases 
might fInd the importance of using sensor networks in order to 
explore enemy forces. Sensor nodes have limited sensing and 
computation. Also, nodes have communication ability. Sensor 
readings collect data when it detects unusual activities of 
enemy forces such as warplanes, and war tanks movement in 
battlefIelds. Data will be sent to the base station through 
routers. In military applications, selective forwarding attacks 
destroy the transmission packets between the source and base 
station, and sometimes between the sensor nodes. Malicious 
nodes refuse to transfer an entire packet. It drops the sensitive 
information and then forwards the remaining packet. 
We designed three layers including MAC pool IDs layer, 
rule-based processing layer, and anomaly detection layer. They 
maintain the safety of data transmission between a source node 
and base station while detecting selective forwarding attacks. 
Furthermore. We demonstrate the performance of the protocol 
by creating a military base scenario. It is simulated using 
Network Simulation-2 NS2. There are some assumptions to 
detect the selective forwarding attack within certain 
applications. We assume that all nodes are the same 
specifIcation. All nodes in the network are having the same 
energy at starting point and having maximum energy. As well 
as, we assume that nodes are uniformly distributed in network 
in a random manner. Malicious nodes should not drop any 
packets before launching a selective forwarding attack, and an 
adversary cannot attack nodes during their deployment. Nodes 
can send data to Base station. Received Signal Strength 
Indicator-RSSI is the mechanism to measure the distance 
between the base station and node. 
The new approach fmds a secure route during the data 
transmission. We assumed, Wireless sensor networks are 
complicated. In order to create a simple solution to detect the 
selective forwarding attack, we have made some assumptions 
for the approach detection within signifIcant applications that 
are susceptible in networks. These assumptions should be 
acceptable in the sensor networks. First of all, we assume that 
secured communication should be part of the networks. 
Second, Malicious nodes should not drop any packets prior to 
the launching of the selective forwarding attack. Third, we 
assume that the adversary cannot compromise a sensor node 
during the deployment. Finally, we assume that authentication 
broadcast protocols were applied to each sensor node. 
A. Selective Forwarding Detection and Monitoring Approach 
In wireless sensor networks, the rule-based intrusion 
detection system (IDS) is one of the mechanisms for protection 
against the security attacks. Rule-based IDS are known as 
signature-based IDS. The network layer in WSNs is threatened 
via some attacks such as a wormhole attack, a sinkhole attack 
and other types of attacks. Our proposal focuses on the 
selective forwarding attack. We design multi layer approach, 
which includes three security layers depicted in Figure 3. The 
fIrst layer is data receiving. In this layer, the important 
information is fIltered and stored. The information includes 
message fIelds that are useful to the rule processing. The 
second layer is rule processing. In this section, rules must be 
applied to the stored data. The message can be rejected or 
refused. In addition, no rules will be applied to the message 
since it fails. The third layer is detection. The detection 
approach saves energy by using low memory and it takes not 
much time. It chooses a secure route to transfer data between 
the source and the base station. Furthermore, SFD approach is 
reliable, energy effIcient, and scalable. All these factors are 
signifIcant for the sensor nodes. Our approach assumes that the 
detection accuracy is high, even though the radio condition is 
poor. 
Fig 3. Selective Forwarding Detection-Multi-Layers 
B. System Model 
The goal of this model is to extend the network life time 
while maintaining the Quality of Service (QoS). The network 
lifetime is very important metrics of wireless sensor networks. 
The model also aims to make a balance for the energy 
utilization therefore, provide longer secure surveillance for the 
military application. 
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B.l. Reliability 
In order to develop the reliable communication, we have to 
determine the reliable path from the sender node to the base 
" " 
station, as the 'fIK nwnber of the sensor nodes in the reliable 
" " , " 
optimal RP path 
(1) 
Obtained using Bellman-Ford algorithm's link 
measurement properties 
(J Oy 
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We start searching the reliable path for communication then 
apply Rayleigh fading model to confirm the reliable 
communication: 
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Fig 4. Reliable Detection Rate of SFD Approach 
B.2. Energy efficiency 
In energy efficiency, we got the differences between the 
node's individual energy consumption, after defined the total 
consumed energy for all nodes in the network. Also, determine 
the average energy consumption of each sensor node, and 
energy consumed for transmitting the packet and for receiving 
the packet. 
n 
l!.Ea = I k(l!.Em ) 
h I) (4) 
Once, an average energy l!.Ea consumption is determined; 
then we substitute the minimal energy consumption l!.Em of 
each sensor node is calculated in equation, 
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Fig 5. Energy Consumption of SFD Approach 
B.3. Scalability 
Scalable probability of network can be defmed as: 
� N+ 
Sp + = I (kt) + kj x If . (l!.p) n + ( V p) I!= I1 L=U J =I) (6) 
We can determine the scalable probability of network, once 
the node wants to leave as: 
1.0 Total Node= 200 Malicious Node= 50% Mobile Node=100/0 - .J... . ! ! ! ! ! ! 
0.9 .. 44 ... 44 t.:::: .:-::t�44�-4F.=.i4.�44:::t:::.4-:: .. r.=4144-::.4::-:t:-:: ' :--4 
0.8 
0.7 
"" o � 0.6 
� 0.5 � 
� 0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
o 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! .. 44 ... 44 •. 4444 ... 4 •... 44 .. 44.4 .. 444 ...•... 444 ...• 44 .. 44 ...• 4 ... 4444.j.444 ... 4 .. t444 .. 444 
l l ! ! ! ! ! ! 
.. 44 .. __ 4� . __ 4_4 .. _�4 .. __ .. __ � 4 .. ___ ... �_ .. ___ .. _�_4 .. __ " ' � __ " ___ 4' � ___ " __ " � __ 4" __ _ 
j ! :  j j j j 
··--···--t·-----·--t-··--··--t-··---···t-··---··-t--··--···t --··----·t---··--··t ---··---
l i ! ! i i 1 •• __ ••• __ i.. ____ ••• _L ••• __ •• __ L_ •• ___ ••• L ••• ___ ••• L_ ••• __ ••• i. __ •• ___ •• i. ___ •• __ •• i. ___ •• __ _ 
j : ! ! j j j i 
.. --... --� .. ---... -� ... --.. --�-.. ---... � ... ---... �--.. --... �-... ---.. �---... -.. �---.. ---.. --.. ---l. .. ---...f .... --...f--.. ---.. l--.. ---.. l---.. --.. l---I r S::-:F:3=:O:-::::-:::::-=l 
:11:lllr 
o 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 
Time (Minutes) 
Fig 6. Scalability Ratio of SFD Approach 
24 27 
4 
C. Results and Discussion 
Approaches are estimated through the simulation. We have 
pointed on energy consumption, average throughput, reliable 
detection rate, and scalability ratio. In the simulation, 200 
sensor nodes are deployed in an area network size 800 * 800 
square meters. Hence, each node has a 35 meters transmission 
range and sensing range of node is 30 meters. Consequently, 
the communication overheads are decreased. 
Figure 7 describes the detection rate of our approach and 
other works. We proved our approach with 50% malicious 
nodes and static nodes. It clearly shows that SFD is stable at 
almost the same level when the time increased from 0 min to 
27 min. Therefore, the new approach is successfully detect the 
malicious node than others. 
In Figure 8, the graph shows our approach with 50% malicious 
nodes and 50% mobile nodes. It clearly also shows that SFD is 
stable when the time increased from 0 min to 27 min. 
Therefore, the new approach is successfully detect the 
malicious node than others respectively. 
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Fig 7. Detection of selective forwarding attack with 50% 
malicious nodes and static nodes 
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malicious nodes and 50% mobile nodes 
V. CONCLUSION 
Selective forwarding detection and monitoring objectives 
are to detect malicious nodes, extend the network's life time, 
maintaining the Quality of Service (QoS) based on the three 
factors which are reliability, energy efficiency, and scalability. 
The new approach contains of three layers including MAC 
pool IDs layer, rule-based processing layer, and anomaly 
detection layer. Selective forwarding detection maintains the 
safety of data transmission between the source and base station. 
Also, it improves the performance of attack detection such as in 
a military application. In addition, the approach IS 
demonstrated using Network Simulation (NS2). 
The network's lifetime is most significant metrics of 
wireless sensor networks. So, we improved reliability 
detection, reduced the energy consumptions and developed 
scalability ratio. These factors aim to balance the energy 
utilization for unevenly distributed sensor nodes and to provide 
longer secure surveillance for a military base while maintaining 
the Quality of Service (QoS). 
Table1: Benchmark Comparison of Approaches 
Approaches Bandwidth Throughput Throughput Scalability Accuracy Reliability Packet Detection Energy 
Consumption without with mobility Delivery rate Consumption 
mobility rate with mobility 
1. SFO 49.6% 321.2 Kb/Sec 314.6 Kb/Sec 99.1% 98.3% 98.4% 99.2% 97.1% 60.4% 
2. LWSS 64.5% 293K b/Sec 297.1Kb/Sec 88.3% 88.9% 88.2% 94.4% 82.1% 75.1% 
3. LWO 69.4% 292.9 Kb/Sec 296.8 Kb/Sec 95.1% 90.2% 90.6% 94.1% 80.2% 81.8% 
4. SOT 72.3% 278.1 Kb/Sec 277.4Kb/Sec 90% 90.9% 89.6% 94.3% 89.8% 69.1% 
5. RSSJ-EM 61.2% 292.8 Kb/Sec 296.3Kb/Sec 88.2% 85.6% 86.3% 94.2% 90.1% 68.5% 
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